Three weapons, three serial numbers.

These three rifles are Belgian. What’s so important about them? Well, the United Nations Panel of Experts on Libya mentioned them in its latest report, released this month:

73. The Panel requested the Belgian authorities to assist in tracing an FNC assault rifle that was photographed in Libya in 2012.2 The Belgian authorities responded that the rifle (serial No. 025992) bore markings that resembled a rifle that was part of an order exported to the Qatari armed forces in Doha around 1980.

99. In the first tracing request, an FN FAL assault rifle photographed in Libya in 2012 (serial No. 1514944) was identified by the Belgian manufacturer as being part of an order that was delivered to the Emirate of Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in 1979.

100. In the second tracing request, another FN FAL assault rifle photographed in Libya in 2012 (serial No. 1731984) was identified as resembling a weapon delivered to the Emirate of Dubai in an order dated 19 April 1991.

The problem? Those rifles were not found in Qatar nor in the UAE. They were found in Libya, in the hands of the men who fought Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

What does it mean? First, that Qatar and the UAE illegally diverted Belgian weapons. Second, that by doing so they breached an UN arms embargo.

Will Belgium change its arms export policy towards those two countries? With the elements of information available today, this question remains open.*

What it shows, though, is the importance of thoroughly documenting the tools of war.

Those rifles were not documented by the UN Panel of Experts, but by journalists on the ground. Those journalists then published their photographs and their stories. The Belgian authorities refused to trace those weapons until it was asked from them by the UN.

If you’re in Belgium and can read French, make sure to get a copy of Le Vif/L’Express today (or before next Thursday) for more details. (For those of you who will read the article, forgive the mistakes the photo editor made: the 1st picture is obviously an FNC, and the serial number on the 3rd page belongs to an FN FAL, not to an FNC.)

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Photos 1 and 2: an FN FAL rifle, with right-hand side serial number. Benghazi, Libya, February 2012, Damien Spleeters.

Photos 3 and 4: an FN FAL rifle, with right-hand side serial number. Benghazi, Libya, June 2012, Jef Linssen.

Photo 5 and 6: an FNC assault rifle, with serial number. Libya, June 2012, Jef Linssen.

*This paragraph was edited on April 19, 14:10 following a discussion held in the comment section.

Trial and error learning. With this kind of investigation, in which you have to find the sense of it all by yourself, there is no other way. This morning, we realized where we went wrong. What are we trying to do? We’re trying to determine the production time and first purchasing countries of Belgian-made FN FAL rifles proliferating in modern conflict areas. Why are we trying to do this? In order to document modern conflicts thoroughly, and in order to identify current arms proliferation plateformes. For more information about our work, feel free to browse through the other articles of this website. It goes well beyond weapons, which are a means to an end, not an end in itself. How are we trying to do this? By comparing the material collected on the ground with data gathered through official sources such as the Belgian arms export licenses available at the Belgian state archives, and with other publicly available sources and literatures, with a trial and error method. Here’s a summary of what we know: 12,000 Belgian FN FAL rifles were reportedly purchased by Syria in 1957. With the exception of 100 FAL rifles licensed for export in 1969 through another company than FN Herstal itself, the arms export licenses available do not mention any later Syrian purchase. The features and serial numbers of FN FAL rifles observed in Syria indicate that those rifles were made after 1973 (the type III upper-receiver was not made before then). Thus, we can assume that those rifles have been diverted to Syria by another country. In September 2012, we came back from Syria with an interesting sample. We could document an FN FAL bearing two serial numbers, which would allow us to know more about its first purchasing country and plateforme of diversion. We assumed, based on its right-hand side serial number (see an example with the picture above), that the rifle was produced in or around 1980. Why? Because, as far as we know, after 1972, the right-hand side serial number engraved on Belgian FN FAL rifles represent the total amount of FAL rifles made by the Herstal plant, and because we assumed that the million was reached in or around 1980. That is were the mistake was. Here is a key element for our research: A chart, prepared for M. Blake Stevens’ Book “The Metric FAL” Volume III by M. Jean Van Rutten, who represented FN Herstal in various countries and was, around 1980, their Chargé de Mission in the FN Defence and Security Division’s Weapons Testing Section. This chart, published in M. Blake Stevens’ book and shown here for the purpose of our research only, shows FAL sales to 1980. “New, FN-made weapons only; no spare parts or client-licensed production”, the description says. This is really important. On the one hand, we know that after 1972, right-hand side serial numbers correspond to the total amount of Belgian FN FAL produced. On the other hand, we have this chart. Based on the serial numbers, we can now roughly determine the year of manufacture of FN FAL rifles. What can we see in this chart? That we made an important mistake: the million FN FAL made was not reached in 1980 but in mid-1972, just about at the introduction of the type III upper-receiver. Why is it important? Because we also assume that after 1972, left-hand side serial numbers represent the total amount of FN FAL rifles purchased by *one single, specific country*. With all these information, we can now try to determine what this country is when we have serial numbers on the two sides of a rifle, by digging in the Belgian arms export licenses archives. That’s what we did, here, and we reached the wrong conclusion that one rifle we found in September 2012 could only come from Qatar or Kuwait. But then the Belgian Foreign Affairs revealed that the rifles actually came from the United Arab Emirates, a country that was rulled out by our demonstration. So we had to think about it all over again, and find were the mistake was. Now we know. The FAL rifles we have found in September 2012 and March 2013 in Syria were not made in or around 1980, but in or around 1973. How many FAL rifles did the UAE have in or around 1973? Well, according to the Belgian archives, between 1972 and 1974, the UAE, formerly known as several entities: “Abu Dhabi”, “Dubai”, were authorized to receive 4,456 Belgian FN FAL rifles. Based on the information above, we can conclude that the UAE could well have been the first buyer of the FAL rifles found in Syria in September 2012 et March 2013.  The Belgian Foreign Affairs only confirmed the source of the September 2012 FAL rifles. But, based on the demonstration above, we can assume, without much risk, that the FAL rifle documented in March 2013 also comes from the UAE. The one of September 2012, with a left-hand side serial number of 4536, was most probably exported in 1974 or shortly after. The one of March 2013, with a left-hand side serial number of 4382 was most probably exporter in 1974. Another conclusion can be reached: Based on the latest information, it appears that, actually, neither Qatar nor Kuwait could have been the first buyers of the FN FAL rifles documented in September 2012 and March 2013, because they did not purchased enough FN FAL rifles between 1972 and 1974 to match with the elements of the demonstration above. Caveats here: the export licenses of the 1975-1979 period are not available for research because they have been illegally destroyed by the Belgian authorities. Most importantly, the fact that this corrected demonstration matches with the revelations of the Belgian Foreign Affairs shows that we can fairly assume that the FAL rifle’s serial numbers, if correctly interpreted can give very valuable pieces of information. Edit 1 March 19: It seems alors that the grooved handguard cannot be a certain sign of production time. We assumed it became standard feature as from 1978, but it’s already present on this rifle made around 1974. More field research should bring more pieces of information. Another interesting thing to point out is that in the FN FAL rifles documented in September 2012, only one had the two serial numbers allowing us to check them with the state archives. The others did not, and appear to have been produced much later, in the 1980’s. But the Belgian Foreign Affairs declared that the UAE was the first buyer nonetheless.  For comments, opinion, advice, please get in touch.
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Trial and error learning. With this kind of investigation, in which you have to find the sense of it all by yourself, there is no other way. This morning, we realized where we went wrong.

What are we trying to do? We’re trying to determine the production time and first purchasing countries of Belgian-made FN FAL rifles proliferating in modern conflict areas.

Why are we trying to do this? In order to document modern conflicts thoroughly, and in order to identify current arms proliferation plateformes. For more information about our work, feel free to browse through the other articles of this website. It goes well beyond weapons, which are a means to an end, not an end in itself.

How are we trying to do this? By comparing the material collected on the ground with data gathered through official sources such as the Belgian arms export licenses available at the Belgian state archives, and with other publicly available sources and literatures, with a trial and error method.

Here’s a summary of what we know:

12,000 Belgian FN FAL rifles were reportedly purchased by Syria in 1957. With the exception of 100 FAL rifles licensed for export in 1969 through another company than FN Herstal itself, the arms export licenses available do not mention any later Syrian purchase.

The features and serial numbers of FN FAL rifles observed in Syria indicate that those rifles were made after 1973 (the type III upper-receiver was not made before then). Thus, we can assume that those rifles have been diverted to Syria by another country.

In September 2012, we came back from Syria with an interesting sample. We could document an FN FAL bearing two serial numbers, which would allow us to know more about its first purchasing country and plateforme of diversion.

We assumed, based on its right-hand side serial number (see an example with the picture above), that the rifle was produced in or around 1980. Why? Because, as far as we know, after 1972, the right-hand side serial number engraved on Belgian FN FAL rifles represent the total amount of FAL rifles made by the Herstal plant, and because we assumed that the million was reached in or around 1980. That is were the mistake was.

Here is a key element for our research: A chart, prepared for M. Blake Stevens’ Book “The Metric FAL” Volume III by M. Jean Van Rutten, who represented FN Herstal in various countries and was, around 1980, their Chargé de Mission in the FN Defence and Security Division’s Weapons Testing Section.

This chart, published in M. Blake Stevens’ book and shown here for the purpose of our research only, shows FAL sales to 1980. “New, FN-made weapons only; no spare parts or client-licensed production”, the description says.

This is really important. On the one hand, we know that after 1972, right-hand side serial numbers correspond to the total amount of Belgian FN FAL produced. On the other hand, we have this chart. Based on the serial numbers, we can now roughly determine the year of manufacture of FN FAL rifles.

What can we see in this chart? That we made an important mistake: the million FN FAL made was not reached in 1980 but in mid-1972, just about at the introduction of the type III upper-receiver.

Why is it important? Because we also assume that after 1972, left-hand side serial numbers represent the total amount of FN FAL rifles purchased by *one single, specific country*. With all these information, we can now try to determine what this country is when we have serial numbers on the two sides of a rifle, by digging in the Belgian arms export licenses archives. That’s what we did, here, and we reached the wrong conclusion that one rifle we found in September 2012 could only come from Qatar or Kuwait.

But then the Belgian Foreign Affairs revealed that the rifles actually came from the United Arab Emirates, a country that was rulled out by our demonstration. So we had to think about it all over again, and find were the mistake was.

Now we know. The FAL rifles we have found in September 2012 and March 2013 in Syria were not made in or around 1980, but in or around 1973.

How many FAL rifles did the UAE have in or around 1973? Well, according to the Belgian archives, between 1972 and 1974, the UAE, formerly known as several entities: “Abu Dhabi”, “Dubai”, were authorized to receive 4,456 Belgian FN FAL rifles.

Based on the information above, we can conclude that the UAE could well have been the first buyer of the FAL rifles found in Syria in September 2012 et March 2013. 

The Belgian Foreign Affairs only confirmed the source of the September 2012 FAL rifles. But, based on the demonstration above, we can assume, without much risk, that the FAL rifle documented in March 2013 also comes from the UAE.

The one of September 2012, with a left-hand side serial number of 4536, was most probably exported in 1974 or shortly after. The one of March 2013, with a left-hand side serial number of 4382 was most probably exporter in 1974.

Another conclusion can be reached: Based on the latest information, it appears that, actually, neither Qatar nor Kuwait could have been the first buyers of the FN FAL rifles documented in September 2012 and March 2013, because they did not purchased enough FN FAL rifles between 1972 and 1974 to match with the elements of the demonstration above. Caveats here: the export licenses of the 1975-1979 period are not available for research because they have been illegally destroyed by the Belgian authorities.

Most importantly, the fact that this corrected demonstration matches with the revelations of the Belgian Foreign Affairs shows that we can fairly assume that the FAL rifle’s serial numbers, if correctly interpreted can give very valuable pieces of information.

Edit 1 March 19: It seems alors that the grooved handguard cannot be a certain sign of production time. We assumed it became standard feature as from 1978, but it’s already present on this rifle made around 1974. More field research should bring more pieces of information. Another interesting thing to point out is that in the FN FAL rifles documented in September 2012, only one had the two serial numbers allowing us to check them with the state archives. The others did not, and appear to have been produced much later, in the 1980’s. But the Belgian Foreign Affairs declared that the UAE was the first buyer nonetheless. 

For comments, opinion, advice, please get in touch.

An incomplete SA-7a MANPADS (the BCU is missing), made in 1970, in the hands of a fighter of the Liwa Suqur Al Shahbaa (the Falcons of Aleppo). Markings on the launching tube and on the gripstock (partially plugged). Hopefully, the whole story should come soon in English. Part of it will already be published tomorrow, in French. (photo by the author, near Azaz, Syria, March 2013.)

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

One more Belgian FN FAL rifle in Syria (where it is called “NATO”). Here’s what can be said on this one, based on what we learnt of the FN FAL in our own experience of it (FN Herstal did not wish to help us in our research on the FN FAL proliferation):

  • Type III upper-receiver: post-1973.
  • Grooved handguard: post-1978.
  • Right-hand side serial number: 1116923, which means, as far as we know, that 1,116,922 FAL rifles were produced before this one at the Herstal plant, in Belgium.
  • Left-hand side serial number: 4382, which means, as far as we know, that the country that bought this FAL rifle already purchased 4,381 rifles before.

We extensively investigated the occurrence of Belgian FN FAL rifles in the Syrian conflict. For more information, you can check this. Go here if you can read French.

We still need your help: We tried to determine the source-country of the diversion by cross-checking the serial numbers we had found with the Belgian arms export licenses we had access to. It appears we made a mistake somewhere: we assumed one particular rifle, documented in the Jebel az-Zawiyah last September, came from Qatar or Kuwait, but the Belgian Foreign Affairs revealed it came from the United Arab Emirates. Get in touch if you think you can help. IMPORTANT UPDATE, March 19, 2013: The mistake has been located. An updated demonstration is available here. 

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

Austrian Steyr AUG A1. No serial numbers could be documented. The markings are partially erased. They say “Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG Austria”, and below: “AUG”. The presence of this type of European-made weapon in Syria is still a mystery. Did Austria authorize the export of its weapons to Bachar al-Assad? If not, who is diverting them to Syria? (By the author, near Azaz, Syria, March 2013.)

Here’s something for those studying the social dynamics defining an armed conflict — especially when it comes to the Syrian conflict, pitting a popular insurrection against a conventional army: you should find some interest in the idiosyncratic names of the tools of war.

Here, this is not a “Steyr AUG A1”, this is a “B44”. Why? Those of you young enough (or old enough, it depends) to remember the computer game “Counter-Strike” will know. “B44” is the keyboard shortcut to “buy” a Steyr AUG in the game. It tells us something on this insurgency.

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

Connecting more dots.

Remember this?

Turkish shotgun shells found in Jebel az-Zawiyah, September 2012. More info here. More, of a slightly different kind, were found in Aleppo (more info on them here).

This time, they are available for those who want to buy them, in one of the several gun shops of Al-Bab. Osman, pictured here, has two. He opened them seven months ago. “A lot of people are buying”, he said during an interview on March 1st, 2013. The guns and ammo are bought in Turkey, and legally cross the border without any problem, Osman explains.

9K115-2 Metis-M anti-tank missile launcher with 9M131 anti-tank missile. Used. The markings indicate that this weapon has been produced in 1999. The rest of the markings is mysterious. By the author, near Azaz, Syria, March 2013. — In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents. The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch. We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name. You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.
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9K115-2 Metis-M anti-tank missile launcher with 9M131 anti-tank missile. Used. The markings indicate that this weapon has been produced in 1999. The rest of the markings is mysterious. By the author, near Azaz, Syria, March 2013.

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

Unexploded 122 mm HE artillery rounds. The markings seem to indicate that at least one was made in 1972. The rest of the markings is mysterious. By the author, Al-Bab, Syria, March 2013.

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

Unexploded Mystery munition. Markings. By the author, Al-Bab, Syria, March 2013. Get in touch if you think you can help identifying this.

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

Unexploded Soviet ОФАБ 100-120 — осколочно-фугасная авиационная бомба (OFAB 100-120 - oskolochno-fugasnaya aviatsionnaya bomba, which seems to roughly mean fragmentation-blast aviation bomb). Markings. By the author, Al-Bab, Syria, March 2013. (Note the mistake I made: no scale reference.)

Eliot Higgins, blogging under the name of Brown Moses, has put together several YouTube videos showing the presence of this type of ordnance in Syria: here.

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

Unexploded Soviet БетАБ-500 (for бетонобойная авиабомба; betonoboynaya aviabomba; concrete-piercing aviation bomb) partially dismantled, awaiting to feed the rebels’s IED machine. Markings. AVU-ET Fuze. By the author, Al-Bab, Syria, March 2013.

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

Acronyme de « Man Portable Air-Defense System », le système de défense anti-aérienne portatif est une arme capricieuse : à usage unique, elle doit être complète, chaque élément en état de marche, pour être totalement opérationnelle. En outre, les versions les plus anciennes, qui sont aussi les plus courantes, sont moins efficaces contre les avions de combat disposant de contre-mesures. En revanche, les hélicoptères et les avions de ligne sont beaucoup plus vulnérables : le MANPADS est autant le rêve de l’insurgé syrien qu’il est le cauchemar de l’anti-terrorisme. Ce sont ces armes, surtout, que les rebelles réclament aux gouvernements qui souhaitent les soutenir.

« Je suis prêt à accepter les conditions des pays qui veulent nous aider. Je suis prêt à signer n’importe quoi », déclare Salih Abdo, commandant d’une unité anti-aérienne qui dit avoir abattu l’hélicoptère du 25 février à Minakh. « Nous rendrons des comptes à ceux qui désirent nous fournir ce type d’armes. » Un officier ayant déserté les rangs du régime il y a un an, M. Abdo a décidé de lancer une initiative dont le but avoué est de rasséréner les gouvernements qui craignent de voir le potentiel destructeur des missiles sol-air tomber entre les mains de groupes qui ne servent pas leurs intérêts.

Dans la vidéo ci-dessus, M. Abdo annonce la création de son unité anti-aérienne. La dynamique est importante: le nord de la Syrie ne compte qu’un nombre limité de bases aériennes. Autour d’Alep, ce sont surtout Jirrah, Taftanaz, Abu ad Duhur, Kuwayris et Minakh. Les deux premières ont été capturées, les trois autres sont assiégées et rendues inutiles.

Pour en savoir plus, lisez La Libre Belgique ce lundi 18 mars 2013: L’asphyxie comme technique de guerre.

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Photo: Salih Abdo, commandant d’une unité anti-aérienne active dans le siège de la base aérienne de Minakh, Syrie, par l’auteur, au début du mois.

De l’extérieur, avec seulement quelques bribes d’information, on serait tenté de dire que le conflit syrien, qui entre dans sa troisième année, semble complètement bloqué. Deux forces se faisant face, pas de progrès notables ou à peine, une guerre qui pourrit et un bilan civil qui ne cesse de grimper.

Regardez la vidéo ci-dessus. Publiée en juillet de l’année passée par la brigade Farouq, l’une des plus importantes unités combattantes de l’insurrection syrienne, elle montre deux transports de troupe de l’armée syrienne se faire réduire en poussière par une arme iconique: l’IED.

Avec les prix parfois prohibitifs des armes et des munitions circulant sur le marché noir qui s’est naturellement développé dans les pays limitrophes pour alimenter les combats en Syrie, les insurgés ont trouvés dans la fabrication d’engins explosifs improvisés un moyen aussi peu cher qu’efficace pour lutter contre une armée régulière.

Dès la fin de l’année 2011, les rebelles commencèrent à se tourner vers cette technologie, et c’est au printemps 2012 que les premiers signes de succès se firent sentir sur les champs de bataille. Dans l’arsenal léger et hétéroclite des insurgés, les engins explosifs improvisés comptent parmi les armes les plus efficaces. Détruisant les véhicules du régime, arrêtant des convois de ravitaillement et infligeant des pertes lourdes aux troupes du gouvernement dans les zones où la résistance armée est forte, ils ont permis l’apparition de vastes zones tampon virtuellement libérées de la présence ennemie.

« L’I.E.D. est le grand égalisateur des champs de bataille. Peu importe la force de votre armée, la bombe sera un jour assez grosse pour détruire n’importe quelle armure », explique John Ismay, un ancien officier démineur américain ayant servi en Irak.

Pour le régime syrien, une mort lente et douloureuse : Ce lundi 18 février 2013, dans La Libre Belgique.

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Photo: Deux BetAB-500 partiellement démantelées, dans un atelier de la périphérie d’Al-Bab, au nord-est d’Alep, par l’auteur. Ces deux bombes de l’ère soviétique, faites pour percer des structures en béton avant d’exploser, ont été larguées sur la ville, le vendredi 1er mars 2013 à 10h45. Elles n’ont pas explosé, et seront recyclées par des insurgés passés maîtres en IED.

This video, posted on YouTube yesterday Feb. 25, is the first documented downing of a Syrian regime’s helicopter by the armed opposition using a MANPADS (for Man Portable Air-Defense System) in which both the launch and the hit are visible.

Some readers will remember that we already witnessed a regime helicopter being hit by a suspected MANPADS missile, in November of last year.

In this case, interestingly, the system used appears to be a Chinese FN-6 MANPADS. Eliot Higgins, blogging under the name of Brown Moses, has gathered several videos in which this system was to be seen in Syria, here.

More information about this very soon, hopefully.

For some context and the latest developments, you can check this, this and this.

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