Connecting more dots.

Remember this?

Turkish shotgun shells found in Jebel az-Zawiyah, September 2012. More info here. More, of a slightly different kind, were found in Aleppo (more info on them here).

This time, they are available for those who want to buy them, in one of the several gun shops of Al-Bab. Osman, pictured here, has two. He opened them seven months ago. “A lot of people are buying”, he said during an interview on March 1st, 2013. The guns and ammo are bought in Turkey, and legally cross the border without any problem, Osman explains.

9K115-2 Metis-M anti-tank missile launcher with 9M131 anti-tank missile. Used. The markings indicate that this weapon has been produced in 1999. The rest of the markings is mysterious. By the author, near Azaz, Syria, March 2013. — In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents. The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch. We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name. You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.
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9K115-2 Metis-M anti-tank missile launcher with 9M131 anti-tank missile. Used. The markings indicate that this weapon has been produced in 1999. The rest of the markings is mysterious. By the author, near Azaz, Syria, March 2013.

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

Unexploded 122 mm HE artillery rounds. The markings seem to indicate that at least one was made in 1972. The rest of the markings is mysterious. By the author, Al-Bab, Syria, March 2013.

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

Unexploded Mystery munition. Markings. By the author, Al-Bab, Syria, March 2013. Get in touch if you think you can help identifying this.

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

Unexploded Soviet ОФАБ 100-120 — осколочно-фугасная авиационная бомба (OFAB 100-120 - oskolochno-fugasnaya aviatsionnaya bomba, which seems to roughly mean fragmentation-blast aviation bomb). Markings. By the author, Al-Bab, Syria, March 2013. (Note the mistake I made: no scale reference.)

Eliot Higgins, blogging under the name of Brown Moses, has put together several YouTube videos showing the presence of this type of ordnance in Syria: here.

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

Unexploded Soviet БетАБ-500 (for бетонобойная авиабомба; betonoboynaya aviabomba; concrete-piercing aviation bomb) partially dismantled, awaiting to feed the rebels’s IED machine. Markings. AVU-ET Fuze. By the author, Al-Bab, Syria, March 2013.

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

De l’extérieur, avec seulement quelques bribes d’information, on serait tenté de dire que le conflit syrien, qui entre dans sa troisième année, semble complètement bloqué. Deux forces se faisant face, pas de progrès notables ou à peine, une guerre qui pourrit et un bilan civil qui ne cesse de grimper.

Regardez la vidéo ci-dessus. Publiée en juillet de l’année passée par la brigade Farouq, l’une des plus importantes unités combattantes de l’insurrection syrienne, elle montre deux transports de troupe de l’armée syrienne se faire réduire en poussière par une arme iconique: l’IED.

Avec les prix parfois prohibitifs des armes et des munitions circulant sur le marché noir qui s’est naturellement développé dans les pays limitrophes pour alimenter les combats en Syrie, les insurgés ont trouvés dans la fabrication d’engins explosifs improvisés un moyen aussi peu cher qu’efficace pour lutter contre une armée régulière.

Dès la fin de l’année 2011, les rebelles commencèrent à se tourner vers cette technologie, et c’est au printemps 2012 que les premiers signes de succès se firent sentir sur les champs de bataille. Dans l’arsenal léger et hétéroclite des insurgés, les engins explosifs improvisés comptent parmi les armes les plus efficaces. Détruisant les véhicules du régime, arrêtant des convois de ravitaillement et infligeant des pertes lourdes aux troupes du gouvernement dans les zones où la résistance armée est forte, ils ont permis l’apparition de vastes zones tampon virtuellement libérées de la présence ennemie.

« L’I.E.D. est le grand égalisateur des champs de bataille. Peu importe la force de votre armée, la bombe sera un jour assez grosse pour détruire n’importe quelle armure », explique John Ismay, un ancien officier démineur américain ayant servi en Irak.

Pour le régime syrien, une mort lente et douloureuse : Ce lundi 18 février 2013, dans La Libre Belgique.

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Photo: Deux BetAB-500 partiellement démantelées, dans un atelier de la périphérie d’Al-Bab, au nord-est d’Alep, par l’auteur. Ces deux bombes de l’ère soviétique, faites pour percer des structures en béton avant d’exploser, ont été larguées sur la ville, le vendredi 1er mars 2013 à 10h45. Elles n’ont pas explosé, et seront recyclées par des insurgés passés maîtres en IED.

Russian Vice-Premier visits Belgian arms company FN Herstal

On December 20th-21st 2012, Dmitry Rogozin, Russian Vice-Premier in charge of the Defense industry, visited the Belgian arms company FN Herstal, according to the Russian press agency Itar-Tass.

The nature of the visit is not clear. The Russian embassy did not have any information on it, nor did the Russian mission to the EU. The Russian representation to NATO did not reply to our multiple requests, so far.

It is not the first time Mr. Rogozin visits FN Herstal. In 2010, he posted on his Twitter account a picture of him shooting a FN SCAR-L short, apparently at a FN shooting range.

Note that the FN operator seems to appear already in a photo set of a FN demonstration in Venezuela in 2011, posted here.

h/t @Bruxelles2

November 2008, the Belgian arms producer FN Herstal, owned by the Walloon government, has already signed a contract in May with Gaddafi’s Libya and is waiting for the export licenses the government has to issue. 

In the meantime, representatives of the company are in Tripoli, on the occasion of the LibDex 2008, to present their products. Those products would, eventually, be found by a reported in the hands of the fighters who captured them from the soldiers of the 32nd “Khamis” Brigade during the 2011 conflict. For more information about this, click here.

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On this photo, the third man from the left (blue suit, not hat, white hair) is Abu-Bakr Yunis, who was the Libyan Minister of Defense under Gaddafi. He was reportedly killed during the battle of Sirte, in October 2011. The first man from the left is Reefi Shreef, head of the Gaddafi Air and Air Defense Forces, said a Libyan activist who added that the man in brown suit, with glasses, facing the camera is the general manager of Waha Expo, where the LixDex 2008 was organized.

Who are the Belgian representatives? One of them is probably this “Mr. Michel” quoted in 2008 by the Tripoli Post: 

We supply Pistols, over assault riffles, light and medium machine guns and several kinds of weapons for ant-rioting. We worked closely with Libyan defense force since seventies, let say after the attainment of Libya’s independence, we do appreciate our partnership.

To see the other pictures, scroll left and right, above. If you recognize any of the persons on these pictures, please contact me at @damspleet.

h/t Libyan Proud

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The pictures were all found on the website of the LibDex

More about crime stats: the importance of the methodology

I just received an email from Nicholas Marsh, researcher at the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers. Mr. Marsh is reacting to the video I posted here earlier, titled “Choose Your Own Crime Stats” (see below).

Mr. Marsh authorized me (thanks!) to quote him at length, and that’s all I’ll do, hoping this would trigger more discussion on the topic.

a) Yes, there has been a steady decline in violent crime in the USA over the past two decades. This has been remarked upon at length in books, newspapers and magazines. So he is wrong to suggest that no one has talked about it. Though its my impression that  the decline hasn’t featured prominently over the last few weeks. In general, I agree that as far as statistics are concerned, the recent debate has featured an absence of stats, or people cherry picking the stats that support their case and ignoring the ones that don’t. 

b) Yes, more violent crime tends to occur in urban areas - I’m guessing that’s the same in Belgium. 

c) There is though a big problem with his comparison of violent crime in the UK and USA. The UK headline numbers (available here http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/hosb0812/hosb0812?view=Binary) are for ‘violence against the person’. If you look at the methodology (see here http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/counting-rules/) they include predictable things like manslaughter, murder or assault, but they also include things such as: conspiracy to murder, causing death by dangerous driving, harassment, illicit abortion, illicit possession of firearms, and assault without injury. The ‘violence against the person’ figures do not include sexual offenses (eg rape), robbery or burglary which are presented separately in the report. 

The FBI statistics (see here http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-1) cover ‘violent crime’ which is defined as: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault (see http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/violent-crime/violent-crime)

So the UK and US violent crime statistics presented in the video are actually covering completely different things. They can’t meaningfully be compared. 

The differences in definition are a general problem when comparing crime across countries. In addition, you have big differences in the level of reporting of crimes. 

Homicide is one offence which tends to have similar definitions (though even then there are lots of differences, eg how manslaughter is treated) and a generally high level of reporting at least in developed countries. So its more meaningful to compare homicide than to other violent crimes.

Mr. Marsh adds, a bit later, in a second email:

It should be possible to compare violent crime in the USA and UK if someone could get data on specific offenses (eg armed robbery).
This article, of Christophe Lamfalussy, was published not so long ago, in La Libre Belgique, along my piece on the COARM report (see here). Some context: the Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister, Didier Reynders, was visiting the Gulf countries recently. In Qatar, he made a declaration regarding the information we uncovered about the Belgian arms diversion tacking place in Syria: In Qatar, Reynders also asked the country not to re-export to Gaza and the Syrian opposition the arms of the FN [FN Herstal, Belgian small arms producer]. The government asked FN, based on pictures published in the press and on the serial numbers of the weapons, to verify the origin of the Belgian arms. This is an interesting twist in the investigation, especially after Mister Reynders said at first that this was not the competence of the federal government: D. Reynders answers the parliamentary question of N. Lijnen regarding the diversion of Belgian arms to Syri… These are the questions that I asked to the Belgian Foreign Affairs. The answers did not come yet. “Au Qatar, Reynders a également demandé que le pays ne réexporte pas vers Gaza et vers l’opposition syrienne les armes de la FN. Le gouvernement a demandé à la FN, sur base de photos publiés dans la presse et des numéros gravés sur les armes, de vérifier l’origine des armes belges, très réputées au Moyen-Orient.” Pourriez-vous m’en dire un peu plus?  Est-ce Monsieur Reynders (les Affaires Etrangères) qui a fait cette demande à la FN?  Sous quelle forme?  Quand cette demande a-t-elle été faite?  Pour quand attendez-vous une réponse?  La FN a-t-elle l’obligation de répondre?  Quelle a été la demande, précisément (identification des premiers acheteurs sur base de numéros de série publiés dans la presse? si oui, quels numéros de série, exactement? et retrouvés en Syrie?)  Je croyais que ce n’était pas la responsabilité des Affaires Etrangères, mais il semble que le ministère s’en occupe tout de même, qu’en est-il?
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This article, of Christophe Lamfalussy, was published not so long ago, in La Libre Belgique, along my piece on the COARM report (see here).

Some context: the Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister, Didier Reynders, was visiting the Gulf countries recently. In Qatar, he made a declaration regarding the information we uncovered about the Belgian arms diversion tacking place in Syria:

In Qatar, Reynders also asked the country not to re-export to Gaza and the Syrian opposition the arms of the FN [FN Herstal, Belgian small arms producer]. The government asked FN, based on pictures published in the press and on the serial numbers of the weapons, to verify the origin of the Belgian arms.

This is an interesting twist in the investigation, especially after Mister Reynders said at first that this was not the competence of the federal government:

D. Reynders answers the parliamentary question of N. Lijnen regarding the diversion of Belgian arms to Syri…

These are the questions that I asked to the Belgian Foreign Affairs. The answers did not come yet.

“Au Qatar, Reynders a également demandé que le pays ne réexporte pas vers Gaza et vers l’opposition syrienne les armes de la FN. Le gouvernement a demandé à la FN, sur base de photos publiés dans la presse et des numéros gravés sur les armes, de vérifier l’origine des armes belges, très réputées au Moyen-Orient.”

  • Pourriez-vous m’en dire un peu plus? 
  • Est-ce Monsieur Reynders (les Affaires Etrangères) qui a fait cette demande à la FN? 
  • Sous quelle forme? 
  • Quand cette demande a-t-elle été faite? 
  • Pour quand attendez-vous une réponse? 
  • La FN a-t-elle l’obligation de répondre? 
  • Quelle a été la demande, précisément (identification des premiers acheteurs sur base de numéros de série publiés dans la presse? si oui, quels numéros de série, exactement? et retrouvés en Syrie?) 
  • Je croyais que ce n’était pas la responsabilité des Affaires Etrangères, mais il semble que le ministère s’en occupe tout de même, qu’en est-il?

The Walloon Region agrees it cannot do its job

According to the criterion 7 of the European Common Position on Arms Export, the Walloon Region has to assess the risk of arms diversion before issuing an export license to a certain company for a certain country. However, the Walloon Region does not have access to the documents that would allow to do so, according to official documents.

The Walloon Region agrees it cannot do its job

As we saw it earlier, Belgian weapons have been diverted to fuel the current Syrian conflict (see the demonstration here). In order to identify the diverting country (or countries) - the first buyer(s) of the weapons, the Walloon Region (the authority issuing export licenses for that type of firearms) would have to have access to the archives of the FN Herstal (the company that produced the diverted weapons). Assuming that the public authority, as it is owning the arms company, had access to those documents, necessary to perform what its own law requires, we introduced a FOIA-equivalent request (see above). According to the answer of the special commission that examined our request, the administration does not have access to such documents. How can the Walloon Region perform its duty, then? How is the authority assessing the diversion risk, based on material documents? These questions remain unanswered.

In the meantime, a new twist in the story: After having declared, in the parliament, that this was not a federal competence, the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the government had asked the FN Herstal to say where the rifles we had seen in Syria were sold in the first place. Soon, on this website, the questions that this declaration triggered.

I’d be interested in hearing any opinions on what is said in this video about crime data in the US (especially after what happened in Newtown, CT).

h/t W.R.

Turkish shells in Russian shotgun to hunt the dogs of Jebel al-Zawiya. Last September, in Syria, we accompanied members of the al-Khalaf family into a dog-hunting trip. When the army of Bashar al-Assad was occupying the  Jebel al-Zawiya area, dogs proliferated by eating the corpses that were dumped in the fields. Today, they wander in flock near the villages, attacking the livings, and now they have to be hunted down. The box of shotgun shells you see above was bought by a member of the al-Khalaf family, from an arms dealer established in the Idlib province, for the equivalent of €15 per box. C.J. Chivers (@cjchivers), senior writer for The New York Times, has found a box of the same brand during his last trip in Aleppo. Thanks to Nic Marsh, of the Norwegian Institute on Small Arms Transfers (@NisatPrio), we’re now able to identify the manufacturer: the Turkish company Turaç. Why are we publishing this? In an effort, as C.J. Chivers puts it, to encourage journalists and researchers in conflict zones and post-conflict areas to document and share details on the tools of war, so that these tools may be better followed, and understood, as they move about our world. If governments and manufactures will not be transparent about weapons transfers, those out in the field where the weapons have their effects can be transparent about where they are found. We could not be more supportive of such an effort. More pictures now, of the weapon those Turkish shells were feeding: The two hunters we accompanied were using this Russian-made shotgun (we had to take several pictures, as the weapon was next to us in the car).   This firearm was also used to hunt the birds we ate. There is a lot to say about this hunting. We leave this for another post, later.
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Turkish shells in Russian shotgun to hunt the dogs of Jebel al-Zawiya.

Last September, in Syria, we accompanied members of the al-Khalaf family into a dog-hunting trip. When the army of Bashar al-Assad was occupying the  Jebel al-Zawiya area, dogs proliferated by eating the corpses that were dumped in the fields. Today, they wander in flock near the villages, attacking the livings, and now they have to be hunted down.

The box of shotgun shells you see above was bought by a member of the al-Khalaf family, from an arms dealer established in the Idlib province, for the equivalent of €15 per box. C.J. Chivers (@cjchivers), senior writer for The New York Times, has found a box of the same brand during his last trip in Aleppo.

Thanks to Nic Marsh, of the Norwegian Institute on Small Arms Transfers (@NisatPrio), we’re now able to identify the manufacturer: the Turkish company Turaç.

Why are we publishing this? In an effort, as C.J. Chivers puts it,

to encourage journalists and researchers in conflict zones and post-conflict areas to document and share details on the tools of war, so that these tools may be better followed, and understood, as they move about our world. If governments and manufactures will not be transparent about weapons transfers, those out in the field where the weapons have their effects can be transparent about where they are found.

We could not be more supportive of such an effort.

More pictures now, of the weapon those Turkish shells were feeding: The two hunters we accompanied were using this Russian-made shotgun (we had to take several pictures, as the weapon was next to us in the car).

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This firearm was also used to hunt the birds we ate. There is a lot to say about this hunting. We leave this for another post, later.

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