In this video posted online on February 22, 2013, a unit identified as part of the “Faroq” group, a prominent insurgent group fighting Syrian government troops in North Syria, is showing an important piece of military equipment: What appears to be the first documented complete SA-24 (Igla-S 9K338) MANPADS, the latest generation of Russian portable air defense missile system. 

With the Assad’s regime still holding the air superiority, Man Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS) appear valuable to the insurgents. But those systems are capricious: In order to be operational, they have to be complete. A complete system consists of a launching tube, a BCU (Battery Coolant Unit), a missile, and a grip stock (containing the trigger mechanism). Even a complete system, if poorly stored, could prove inefficient.

Syrian insurgents have repeatedly appeared, on video published on YouTube, with complete or incomplete MANPADS of earlier generations. Those older systems, while deadly against civilian aircrafts, especially during their take off and landing phases, are much less efficient against modern military aircrafts, equipped with countermeasures. A problem that could be overcome by the SA-24.

Eliot Higgins, blogging under the name of Brown Moses, gathered at the end of 2012 several videos where incomplete SA-24 MANPADS were captured by the Syrian opposition, here, here and here. Some “Maket” — or training, demonstration — systems, painted in grey, not in green, were also captured, leading to the assumption that operation SA-24 systems could be present, as well.

This latest video seems to confirm that — note, nevertheless, that one would have to see the markings on the tubes in order to be sure. However, one little detail, in this video, needs more attention.

Matthew Schroeder, analyst at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and at the Small Arms Survey, notes that the gripstock attached to the SA-24 tube appears to be similar in its design to a SA-18 gripstock, less to a SA-24 one. But the absence of a detailed and thorough documentation of the equipment makes it impossible, so far, to be absolutely sure that we are in presence of a complete SA-24 system.

M. Schroeder also adds that while the exports of vehicle-mounted launchers and SA-24 missiles to Syria are well-documented, exports of SA-24 MANPADS “were just rumors”.

This SA-24 case, and this latest video, reminds us of the importance of field research when it comes to documenting armed conflicts. We are no big fan of the “YouTube arms spotting” beat, but we do recognize its importance, only if it is used to help a thoroughly documented field report, to help understanding the dynamics and the complexity of such conflicts.

So, is this latest video showing a complete SA-24 MANPADS, of some kind of mock-up inefficient hybrid system? “Had they showed the weapon being fired, we would be closer to answering that question”, says M. Schroeder. We’ll soon be back on the ground, looking for answers.

More background on MANPADS can be obtained here, and here.

Edit Feb 26, 2013: Apologies for having taken the pictures down. We thought they would not help the readers comparing the different models of MANPADS and the compatibility and specificities of the gripstocks.

Unidentified gunmen kidnapped journalist James Foley in northwest Syria on Thanksgiving Day, November 22 2012. I met Jim in February of this year, in Tripoli, Libya. And the news of his disappearance is haunting me. The family appeals for the release of Jim unharmed. Another journalist, Austin Tice, has been missing in Syria since August 2012. Too many journalists have been abducted, harmed, harassed or killed this last year. Join the appeal to free James Foley. (the picture of Jim, above, is from the website www.freejamesfoley.org) 
Pop-upView Separately

Unidentified gunmen kidnapped journalist James Foley in northwest Syria on Thanksgiving Day, November 22 2012.

I met Jim in February of this year, in Tripoli, Libya. And the news of his disappearance is haunting me.

The family appeals for the release of Jim unharmed.

Another journalist, Austin Tice, has been missing in Syria since August 2012.

Too many journalists have been abducted, harmed, harassed or killed this last year. Join the appeal to free James Foley.

(the picture of Jim, above, is from the website www.freejamesfoley.org) 

This article, of Christophe Lamfalussy, was published not so long ago, in La Libre Belgique, along my piece on the COARM report (see here). Some context: the Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister, Didier Reynders, was visiting the Gulf countries recently. In Qatar, he made a declaration regarding the information we uncovered about the Belgian arms diversion tacking place in Syria: In Qatar, Reynders also asked the country not to re-export to Gaza and the Syrian opposition the arms of the FN [FN Herstal, Belgian small arms producer]. The government asked FN, based on pictures published in the press and on the serial numbers of the weapons, to verify the origin of the Belgian arms. This is an interesting twist in the investigation, especially after Mister Reynders said at first that this was not the competence of the federal government: D. Reynders answers the parliamentary question of N. Lijnen regarding the diversion of Belgian arms to Syri… These are the questions that I asked to the Belgian Foreign Affairs. The answers did not come yet. “Au Qatar, Reynders a également demandé que le pays ne réexporte pas vers Gaza et vers l’opposition syrienne les armes de la FN. Le gouvernement a demandé à la FN, sur base de photos publiés dans la presse et des numéros gravés sur les armes, de vérifier l’origine des armes belges, très réputées au Moyen-Orient.” Pourriez-vous m’en dire un peu plus?  Est-ce Monsieur Reynders (les Affaires Etrangères) qui a fait cette demande à la FN?  Sous quelle forme?  Quand cette demande a-t-elle été faite?  Pour quand attendez-vous une réponse?  La FN a-t-elle l’obligation de répondre?  Quelle a été la demande, précisément (identification des premiers acheteurs sur base de numéros de série publiés dans la presse? si oui, quels numéros de série, exactement? et retrouvés en Syrie?)  Je croyais que ce n’était pas la responsabilité des Affaires Etrangères, mais il semble que le ministère s’en occupe tout de même, qu’en est-il?
Pop-upView Separately

This article, of Christophe Lamfalussy, was published not so long ago, in La Libre Belgique, along my piece on the COARM report (see here).

Some context: the Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister, Didier Reynders, was visiting the Gulf countries recently. In Qatar, he made a declaration regarding the information we uncovered about the Belgian arms diversion tacking place in Syria:

In Qatar, Reynders also asked the country not to re-export to Gaza and the Syrian opposition the arms of the FN [FN Herstal, Belgian small arms producer]. The government asked FN, based on pictures published in the press and on the serial numbers of the weapons, to verify the origin of the Belgian arms.

This is an interesting twist in the investigation, especially after Mister Reynders said at first that this was not the competence of the federal government:

D. Reynders answers the parliamentary question of N. Lijnen regarding the diversion of Belgian arms to Syri…

These are the questions that I asked to the Belgian Foreign Affairs. The answers did not come yet.

“Au Qatar, Reynders a également demandé que le pays ne réexporte pas vers Gaza et vers l’opposition syrienne les armes de la FN. Le gouvernement a demandé à la FN, sur base de photos publiés dans la presse et des numéros gravés sur les armes, de vérifier l’origine des armes belges, très réputées au Moyen-Orient.”

  • Pourriez-vous m’en dire un peu plus? 
  • Est-ce Monsieur Reynders (les Affaires Etrangères) qui a fait cette demande à la FN? 
  • Sous quelle forme? 
  • Quand cette demande a-t-elle été faite? 
  • Pour quand attendez-vous une réponse? 
  • La FN a-t-elle l’obligation de répondre? 
  • Quelle a été la demande, précisément (identification des premiers acheteurs sur base de numéros de série publiés dans la presse? si oui, quels numéros de série, exactement? et retrouvés en Syrie?) 
  • Je croyais que ce n’était pas la responsabilité des Affaires Etrangères, mais il semble que le ministère s’en occupe tout de même, qu’en est-il?
Turkish shells in Russian shotgun to hunt the dogs of Jebel al-Zawiya. Last September, in Syria, we accompanied members of the al-Khalaf family into a dog-hunting trip. When the army of Bashar al-Assad was occupying the  Jebel al-Zawiya area, dogs proliferated by eating the corpses that were dumped in the fields. Today, they wander in flock near the villages, attacking the livings, and now they have to be hunted down. The box of shotgun shells you see above was bought by a member of the al-Khalaf family, from an arms dealer established in the Idlib province, for the equivalent of €15 per box. C.J. Chivers (@cjchivers), senior writer for The New York Times, has found a box of the same brand during his last trip in Aleppo. Thanks to Nic Marsh, of the Norwegian Institute on Small Arms Transfers (@NisatPrio), we’re now able to identify the manufacturer: the Turkish company Turaç. Why are we publishing this? In an effort, as C.J. Chivers puts it, to encourage journalists and researchers in conflict zones and post-conflict areas to document and share details on the tools of war, so that these tools may be better followed, and understood, as they move about our world. If governments and manufactures will not be transparent about weapons transfers, those out in the field where the weapons have their effects can be transparent about where they are found. We could not be more supportive of such an effort. More pictures now, of the weapon those Turkish shells were feeding: The two hunters we accompanied were using this Russian-made shotgun (we had to take several pictures, as the weapon was next to us in the car).   This firearm was also used to hunt the birds we ate. There is a lot to say about this hunting. We leave this for another post, later.
Pop-upView Separately

Turkish shells in Russian shotgun to hunt the dogs of Jebel al-Zawiya.

Last September, in Syria, we accompanied members of the al-Khalaf family into a dog-hunting trip. When the army of Bashar al-Assad was occupying the  Jebel al-Zawiya area, dogs proliferated by eating the corpses that were dumped in the fields. Today, they wander in flock near the villages, attacking the livings, and now they have to be hunted down.

The box of shotgun shells you see above was bought by a member of the al-Khalaf family, from an arms dealer established in the Idlib province, for the equivalent of €15 per box. C.J. Chivers (@cjchivers), senior writer for The New York Times, has found a box of the same brand during his last trip in Aleppo.

Thanks to Nic Marsh, of the Norwegian Institute on Small Arms Transfers (@NisatPrio), we’re now able to identify the manufacturer: the Turkish company Turaç.

Why are we publishing this? In an effort, as C.J. Chivers puts it,

to encourage journalists and researchers in conflict zones and post-conflict areas to document and share details on the tools of war, so that these tools may be better followed, and understood, as they move about our world. If governments and manufactures will not be transparent about weapons transfers, those out in the field where the weapons have their effects can be transparent about where they are found.

We could not be more supportive of such an effort.

More pictures now, of the weapon those Turkish shells were feeding: The two hunters we accompanied were using this Russian-made shotgun (we had to take several pictures, as the weapon was next to us in the car).

image

image

image

image

image 

This firearm was also used to hunt the birds we ate. There is a lot to say about this hunting. We leave this for another post, later.

image

image

cjchivers:

Videos From Syria Appear to Show First Confirmed Hit of Aircraft by Surface-to-Air Missile.

On the At War blog, an update to the Syrian war. Here.  We’ll have more soon.

ABOUT THE PHOTOGRAPHS

Screen grabs from videos that appear to show the downing today of an Mi-8 transport helicopter by a heat-seeking missile, over a suburb of Aleppo.

Great work by CJ Chivers. My article about this event is on the Slate website, in French, here.

Which Countries are Supplying Syrian Rebels with Belgian FAL Rifles? The Data Answer

IMPORTANT UPDATE, March 19, 2013: there was a mistake in this demonstration, it has been corrected. An updated demonstration is available here. Please consider the demonstration below has part of a trial and error learning process.

Some results out of a first digging into the Belgian arms export licenses archives.

Keep in mind that a license does not always equal an export. So far, we do not have the data for the arms exports themselves, but the licenses give quite a good idea of what was going on.

For now, we’ll focus on the licenses asked by the FN Herstal plant regarding only one type of equipment: an “automatic/semi-automatic rifle caliber 7.62”. As no other rifle of this caliber was produced by this plant in that period, we can assume that these licenses are for the FN FAL.

We did not have access to all the archives, for several reasons (we’ll talk about it later). Partly thanks to a FOIA procedure, we had access to the years: 

  • 1969-1974
  • 1980-1988

Total: 15 years

The FAL production, in Belgium, started in 1953 to end somewhere at the end of the 80s (the latest occurrence is 1988 for the moment). Years missing: 21.

These are the countries we studied:

  • Syria
  • Turkey
  • Iraq
  • Jordan
  • Qatar
  • Lebanon
  • Libya
  • Saudi Arabia
  • Kuwait
  • United Arab Emirats
  • Oman

Please note that we are still studying the data: those results might still change - slightly.


Afficher The FAL presence around Syria sur une carte plus grande

DATA

SYRIA

  • 1969-1974: 0*
  • 1980-1988: 0
  • TOTAL: 0

*There is a mention of a 100 FAL rifles license for Syria in 1969. This license was not asked by the FN Herstal plant, but by another company. It is thus difficult to assess if those FAL rifles were made in Belgium, and we preferred to leave them out for now. We will write soon about the Belgian FAL rifles sold to Syria before 1969, thanks to someone who approached us on Twitter.

TURKEY

  • 1969-1974: 0
  • 1980-1988: 0
  • TOTAL: 0

IRAQ

  • 1969-1974: 0
  • 1980-1988: 0
  • TOTAL: 0

JORDAN

  • 1969-1974: 0
  • 1980-1988:  max. 9
  • TOTAL: max. 9

QATAR

  • 1969-1974: 2,000
  • 1980-1988: 12,400
  • TOTAL: 14,400

LEBANON

  • 1969-1974: 10,715
  • 1980-1988: 0
  • TOTAL: 10,715

LIBYA

  • 1969-1974: 44,260
  • 1980-1988: 2,000
  • TOTAL: 46,260

SAUDI ARABIA

  • 1969-1974: 19,982
  • 1980-1988: 4,501
  • TOTAL: 24,483

KUWAIT

  • 1969-1974: 2,310
  • 1980-1988: 26,206
  • TOTAL: 28,516

UNITED ARAB EMIRATS

  • 1969-1974: 7,069
  • 1980-1988: 6,708
  • TOTAL: 13,777

OMAN

  • 1969-1974: 17,861
  • 1980-1988: 6,201
  • TOTAL: 24,062

OBSERVATIONS

Although the data is very limited (limited number of years + license is not export), some observations can be made. These observations are based on the temporary results and are, thus, not definitive.

With the exception of some Israeli-made rifles, the FALs observed in Syria do not bear any factory markings other than the typical Belgian production marks. Other marking could have indicated rifles were produced or assembled outside of Belgium; as it stands, the rifles observe appear to have originated from FN Herstal.

According to the features and to the serial numbers observed on the FAL rifles we have found in Syria, we estimate their production time to be post-78, and probably somewhere in the years 1980.

Syria did not order any FAL rifles between 1980 and 1988. Therefore, the FAL rifles observed on the ground come from outside.

The countries we chose to study are the one regularly appearing in the news as sending Syrian insurgents weapons or as being a territory from which weapons are supplied to them.

Rebel fighters have said that some of their FAL rifles were supplied by Libya. But most of the Libyan FAL rifles were ordered before 1980. Therefore, most of the FAL rifles supplied by Libya do not originate from Libya itself.

A CONCRETE EXAMPLE

Have a look at those pictures, below, part of a batch from Syria we published earlier. Let’s narrow down the production time and possible countries of diversion.

image

PICTURE 1: This is a FAL rifle found in the Jebel al-Zawiya region in September 2012 in the hands of the insurgents fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad. No licensed production marks were found on this rifle, which indicates that this weapons has been produced in Belgium, at the FN Herstal plant.

image

PICTURE 2: The upper receiver is a Type III receiver, which was made as from 1973. This rifle was, thus, made after 1973.

image

PICTURE 3: The bipods grooves, under the hand guard, is an option introduced as standard as from 1978. This rifle was thus made after 1978.

image

PICTURE 4: There are two serial numbers on this rifle. This feature was introduced in 1972, which confirms the fact that this rifle is a post 1972 rifle. Moreover, after 1972, the serial number found on the right of the FN FAL rifle indicates the total number of FAL rifles made by FN Herstal in Belgium. The million was reached in or after 1978. This confirms what we said about the bipod grooves feature. According to the right side serial number, we can assess that this rifle was produced in or around 1980.

image

PICTURE 5: As from 1972, the left side serial number indicates the number of FN FAL rifles in a country’s stock. This FN FAL rifle, being the 1.117.071st of its kind produced in Belgium, is only the 4536th to have been sold to a particular country, in or around 1980. What is this country?

Well, it’s not Syria, which means that the country that bought this FN FAL rifle in or around 1980 diverted this weapon to a 3rd party at one point.

Looking at the data above, we can say that this rifle was not sold to Turkey, nor to Iraq, and probably not to Jordania. It was not sold to Libya, nor Saudi Arabia, nor Lebanon, nor the UAE, nor Oman. All those countries already had a stock of FN FAL counting more than 4536 rifles in 1980. On the other hand, this rifle could well come from Qatar or Kuwait.

Only one of the FAL rifles we observed in Syria was bearing two serial numbers, which allowed us to narrow down the possibilities. With the other rifles, only the ‘general’ right side serial number was there. So we can only talk about the possible production time, and not about the possible diverting country. This could also mean that more than one country is supplying Belgian FAL rifles to the rebels. The other rifles observed bear de serial numbers: 1,730,043 ; 1,732,382 ; 1,462,215 ; 1,473,224 ; 1,474,077. This indicates that they have been produced after 1980, and can not, therefore, have been purchased by Syria, according to the Belgian arms export licenses we had access to.

There is a way to know where those FAL rifles were sold to, and which country diverted them. The only way to know which countries are supplying the Syrian insurgents in FAL rifles would be to trace the serial numbers collected on the ground. In the Walloon Parliament, some have asked for the release of all FAL serial numbers in order to map the proliferation. The Belgian Walloon authorities, if they want to respect the legislation they are promoting, have to launch such a tracing procedure and have to make the result public. Will they do it?

—

Any comment, observation, reaction: damien.spleeters@gmail.com or @damspleet on Twitter.

All the pictures are from the author.

Thanks to those who contributed to this article.

Thanks to N.R. Jenzen-Jones (@RogueAdventurer) for the editing.

In this video, uploaded on November 8, 2012, the Shuhada Suriya Brigade, in the Jebel al-Zawiya, Syria, gives a good view of its small arms arsenal. I count 11 FAL rifles in this video (see screenshots below). But there is probably more of them.

Thanks to @Bjoernen_dk for pointing this video out to me.

Two new videos from Syria in which FAL rifles appear.

Three in the first one, above (uploaded on November 2, 2012).

At least one, on the far right, in a second video (uploaded on November 7, 2012).

Thanks to @Brown_Moses and @bjoernen_dk for pointing them out to me.

A FAL rifle equipped with optic scope and used to snipe in Blleramoon district, Aleppo, Syria. Video uploaded on November 2, 2012. Once again, it looks like this fighter might be experiencing some trouble with his FAL rifle. He fires once, then has to manually action the bolt to feed the next cartridge and eject the spent one.

Two other examples of this problem were observed here and here.

(h/t @Bjoernen_dk)

A FAL rifle in the hands of a Syrian rebel fighter in Deir Ez Zor. Uploaded on November 2, 2012.

(h/t @Brown_Moses)

Two FAL rifles equipped with optic scopes, used by the Islam Brigade, which usually operates around Damascus, Syria. Video uploaded on November 2, 2012.

(h/t @Brown_Moses)

10 minutes of hell for this Syrian fighter. The FAL rifle he is using to snipe, equipped with an optic scope, fails to eject and to feed. The constant malfunction transforms his rifle into some sort of bolt action FAL. At some point, the sniper even has to action the bolt by stepping on it. We encounter one other video where Syrian rebels were experiencing the same kind of malfunctions with their FAL rifles, which can make the difference between life and death when combattants are engaged in a firefight.

The question now is: why are those fighters having such problems with their FAL rifles in Syria? Although the videos are not detailed enough to provide any hints, interviews on the ground lead us to think that a possible answer has to be found in the type of ammunition used. More about this soon, without a doubt.

I could not identify the location exactly. It appears to be in Al Qadam, Damascus. Video uploaded on October 29, 2012.

h/t to @bjoernen_dk and @ali_alsanah

Top