Three weapons, three serial numbers.

These three rifles are Belgian. What’s so important about them? Well, the United Nations Panel of Experts on Libya mentioned them in its latest report, released this month:

73. The Panel requested the Belgian authorities to assist in tracing an FNC assault rifle that was photographed in Libya in 2012.2 The Belgian authorities responded that the rifle (serial No. 025992) bore markings that resembled a rifle that was part of an order exported to the Qatari armed forces in Doha around 1980.

99. In the first tracing request, an FN FAL assault rifle photographed in Libya in 2012 (serial No. 1514944) was identified by the Belgian manufacturer as being part of an order that was delivered to the Emirate of Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in 1979.

100. In the second tracing request, another FN FAL assault rifle photographed in Libya in 2012 (serial No. 1731984) was identified as resembling a weapon delivered to the Emirate of Dubai in an order dated 19 April 1991.

The problem? Those rifles were not found in Qatar nor in the UAE. They were found in Libya, in the hands of the men who fought Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

What does it mean? First, that Qatar and the UAE illegally diverted Belgian weapons. Second, that by doing so they breached an UN arms embargo.

Will Belgium change its arms export policy towards those two countries? With the elements of information available today, this question remains open.*

What it shows, though, is the importance of thoroughly documenting the tools of war.

Those rifles were not documented by the UN Panel of Experts, but by journalists on the ground. Those journalists then published their photographs and their stories. The Belgian authorities refused to trace those weapons until it was asked from them by the UN.

If you’re in Belgium and can read French, make sure to get a copy of Le Vif/L’Express today (or before next Thursday) for more details. (For those of you who will read the article, forgive the mistakes the photo editor made: the 1st picture is obviously an FNC, and the serial number on the 3rd page belongs to an FN FAL, not to an FNC.)

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Photos 1 and 2: an FN FAL rifle, with right-hand side serial number. Benghazi, Libya, February 2012, Damien Spleeters.

Photos 3 and 4: an FN FAL rifle, with right-hand side serial number. Benghazi, Libya, June 2012, Jef Linssen.

Photo 5 and 6: an FNC assault rifle, with serial number. Libya, June 2012, Jef Linssen.

*This paragraph was edited on April 19, 14:10 following a discussion held in the comment section.

Trial and error learning. With this kind of investigation, in which you have to find the sense of it all by yourself, there is no other way. This morning, we realized where we went wrong. What are we trying to do? We’re trying to determine the production time and first purchasing countries of Belgian-made FN FAL rifles proliferating in modern conflict areas. Why are we trying to do this? In order to document modern conflicts thoroughly, and in order to identify current arms proliferation plateformes. For more information about our work, feel free to browse through the other articles of this website. It goes well beyond weapons, which are a means to an end, not an end in itself. How are we trying to do this? By comparing the material collected on the ground with data gathered through official sources such as the Belgian arms export licenses available at the Belgian state archives, and with other publicly available sources and literatures, with a trial and error method. Here’s a summary of what we know: 12,000 Belgian FN FAL rifles were reportedly purchased by Syria in 1957. With the exception of 100 FAL rifles licensed for export in 1969 through another company than FN Herstal itself, the arms export licenses available do not mention any later Syrian purchase. The features and serial numbers of FN FAL rifles observed in Syria indicate that those rifles were made after 1973 (the type III upper-receiver was not made before then). Thus, we can assume that those rifles have been diverted to Syria by another country. In September 2012, we came back from Syria with an interesting sample. We could document an FN FAL bearing two serial numbers, which would allow us to know more about its first purchasing country and plateforme of diversion. We assumed, based on its right-hand side serial number (see an example with the picture above), that the rifle was produced in or around 1980. Why? Because, as far as we know, after 1972, the right-hand side serial number engraved on Belgian FN FAL rifles represent the total amount of FAL rifles made by the Herstal plant, and because we assumed that the million was reached in or around 1980. That is were the mistake was. Here is a key element for our research: A chart, prepared for M. Blake Stevens’ Book “The Metric FAL” Volume III by M. Jean Van Rutten, who represented FN Herstal in various countries and was, around 1980, their Chargé de Mission in the FN Defence and Security Division’s Weapons Testing Section. This chart, published in M. Blake Stevens’ book and shown here for the purpose of our research only, shows FAL sales to 1980. “New, FN-made weapons only; no spare parts or client-licensed production”, the description says. This is really important. On the one hand, we know that after 1972, right-hand side serial numbers correspond to the total amount of Belgian FN FAL produced. On the other hand, we have this chart. Based on the serial numbers, we can now roughly determine the year of manufacture of FN FAL rifles. What can we see in this chart? That we made an important mistake: the million FN FAL made was not reached in 1980 but in mid-1972, just about at the introduction of the type III upper-receiver. Why is it important? Because we also assume that after 1972, left-hand side serial numbers represent the total amount of FN FAL rifles purchased by *one single, specific country*. With all these information, we can now try to determine what this country is when we have serial numbers on the two sides of a rifle, by digging in the Belgian arms export licenses archives. That’s what we did, here, and we reached the wrong conclusion that one rifle we found in September 2012 could only come from Qatar or Kuwait. But then the Belgian Foreign Affairs revealed that the rifles actually came from the United Arab Emirates, a country that was rulled out by our demonstration. So we had to think about it all over again, and find were the mistake was. Now we know. The FAL rifles we have found in September 2012 and March 2013 in Syria were not made in or around 1980, but in or around 1973. How many FAL rifles did the UAE have in or around 1973? Well, according to the Belgian archives, between 1972 and 1974, the UAE, formerly known as several entities: “Abu Dhabi”, “Dubai”, were authorized to receive 4,456 Belgian FN FAL rifles. Based on the information above, we can conclude that the UAE could well have been the first buyer of the FAL rifles found in Syria in September 2012 et March 2013.  The Belgian Foreign Affairs only confirmed the source of the September 2012 FAL rifles. But, based on the demonstration above, we can assume, without much risk, that the FAL rifle documented in March 2013 also comes from the UAE. The one of September 2012, with a left-hand side serial number of 4536, was most probably exported in 1974 or shortly after. The one of March 2013, with a left-hand side serial number of 4382 was most probably exporter in 1974. Another conclusion can be reached: Based on the latest information, it appears that, actually, neither Qatar nor Kuwait could have been the first buyers of the FN FAL rifles documented in September 2012 and March 2013, because they did not purchased enough FN FAL rifles between 1972 and 1974 to match with the elements of the demonstration above. Caveats here: the export licenses of the 1975-1979 period are not available for research because they have been illegally destroyed by the Belgian authorities. Most importantly, the fact that this corrected demonstration matches with the revelations of the Belgian Foreign Affairs shows that we can fairly assume that the FAL rifle’s serial numbers, if correctly interpreted can give very valuable pieces of information. Edit 1 March 19: It seems alors that the grooved handguard cannot be a certain sign of production time. We assumed it became standard feature as from 1978, but it’s already present on this rifle made around 1974. More field research should bring more pieces of information. Another interesting thing to point out is that in the FN FAL rifles documented in September 2012, only one had the two serial numbers allowing us to check them with the state archives. The others did not, and appear to have been produced much later, in the 1980’s. But the Belgian Foreign Affairs declared that the UAE was the first buyer nonetheless.  For comments, opinion, advice, please get in touch.
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Trial and error learning. With this kind of investigation, in which you have to find the sense of it all by yourself, there is no other way. This morning, we realized where we went wrong.

What are we trying to do? We’re trying to determine the production time and first purchasing countries of Belgian-made FN FAL rifles proliferating in modern conflict areas.

Why are we trying to do this? In order to document modern conflicts thoroughly, and in order to identify current arms proliferation plateformes. For more information about our work, feel free to browse through the other articles of this website. It goes well beyond weapons, which are a means to an end, not an end in itself.

How are we trying to do this? By comparing the material collected on the ground with data gathered through official sources such as the Belgian arms export licenses available at the Belgian state archives, and with other publicly available sources and literatures, with a trial and error method.

Here’s a summary of what we know:

12,000 Belgian FN FAL rifles were reportedly purchased by Syria in 1957. With the exception of 100 FAL rifles licensed for export in 1969 through another company than FN Herstal itself, the arms export licenses available do not mention any later Syrian purchase.

The features and serial numbers of FN FAL rifles observed in Syria indicate that those rifles were made after 1973 (the type III upper-receiver was not made before then). Thus, we can assume that those rifles have been diverted to Syria by another country.

In September 2012, we came back from Syria with an interesting sample. We could document an FN FAL bearing two serial numbers, which would allow us to know more about its first purchasing country and plateforme of diversion.

We assumed, based on its right-hand side serial number (see an example with the picture above), that the rifle was produced in or around 1980. Why? Because, as far as we know, after 1972, the right-hand side serial number engraved on Belgian FN FAL rifles represent the total amount of FAL rifles made by the Herstal plant, and because we assumed that the million was reached in or around 1980. That is were the mistake was.

Here is a key element for our research: A chart, prepared for M. Blake Stevens’ Book “The Metric FAL” Volume III by M. Jean Van Rutten, who represented FN Herstal in various countries and was, around 1980, their Chargé de Mission in the FN Defence and Security Division’s Weapons Testing Section.

This chart, published in M. Blake Stevens’ book and shown here for the purpose of our research only, shows FAL sales to 1980. “New, FN-made weapons only; no spare parts or client-licensed production”, the description says.

This is really important. On the one hand, we know that after 1972, right-hand side serial numbers correspond to the total amount of Belgian FN FAL produced. On the other hand, we have this chart. Based on the serial numbers, we can now roughly determine the year of manufacture of FN FAL rifles.

What can we see in this chart? That we made an important mistake: the million FN FAL made was not reached in 1980 but in mid-1972, just about at the introduction of the type III upper-receiver.

Why is it important? Because we also assume that after 1972, left-hand side serial numbers represent the total amount of FN FAL rifles purchased by *one single, specific country*. With all these information, we can now try to determine what this country is when we have serial numbers on the two sides of a rifle, by digging in the Belgian arms export licenses archives. That’s what we did, here, and we reached the wrong conclusion that one rifle we found in September 2012 could only come from Qatar or Kuwait.

But then the Belgian Foreign Affairs revealed that the rifles actually came from the United Arab Emirates, a country that was rulled out by our demonstration. So we had to think about it all over again, and find were the mistake was.

Now we know. The FAL rifles we have found in September 2012 and March 2013 in Syria were not made in or around 1980, but in or around 1973.

How many FAL rifles did the UAE have in or around 1973? Well, according to the Belgian archives, between 1972 and 1974, the UAE, formerly known as several entities: “Abu Dhabi”, “Dubai”, were authorized to receive 4,456 Belgian FN FAL rifles.

Based on the information above, we can conclude that the UAE could well have been the first buyer of the FAL rifles found in Syria in September 2012 et March 2013. 

The Belgian Foreign Affairs only confirmed the source of the September 2012 FAL rifles. But, based on the demonstration above, we can assume, without much risk, that the FAL rifle documented in March 2013 also comes from the UAE.

The one of September 2012, with a left-hand side serial number of 4536, was most probably exported in 1974 or shortly after. The one of March 2013, with a left-hand side serial number of 4382 was most probably exporter in 1974.

Another conclusion can be reached: Based on the latest information, it appears that, actually, neither Qatar nor Kuwait could have been the first buyers of the FN FAL rifles documented in September 2012 and March 2013, because they did not purchased enough FN FAL rifles between 1972 and 1974 to match with the elements of the demonstration above. Caveats here: the export licenses of the 1975-1979 period are not available for research because they have been illegally destroyed by the Belgian authorities.

Most importantly, the fact that this corrected demonstration matches with the revelations of the Belgian Foreign Affairs shows that we can fairly assume that the FAL rifle’s serial numbers, if correctly interpreted can give very valuable pieces of information.

Edit 1 March 19: It seems alors that the grooved handguard cannot be a certain sign of production time. We assumed it became standard feature as from 1978, but it’s already present on this rifle made around 1974. More field research should bring more pieces of information. Another interesting thing to point out is that in the FN FAL rifles documented in September 2012, only one had the two serial numbers allowing us to check them with the state archives. The others did not, and appear to have been produced much later, in the 1980’s. But the Belgian Foreign Affairs declared that the UAE was the first buyer nonetheless. 

For comments, opinion, advice, please get in touch.

One more Belgian FN FAL rifle in Syria (where it is called “NATO”). Here’s what can be said on this one, based on what we learnt of the FN FAL in our own experience of it (FN Herstal did not wish to help us in our research on the FN FAL proliferation):

  • Type III upper-receiver: post-1973.
  • Grooved handguard: post-1978.
  • Right-hand side serial number: 1116923, which means, as far as we know, that 1,116,922 FAL rifles were produced before this one at the Herstal plant, in Belgium.
  • Left-hand side serial number: 4382, which means, as far as we know, that the country that bought this FAL rifle already purchased 4,381 rifles before.

We extensively investigated the occurrence of Belgian FN FAL rifles in the Syrian conflict. For more information, you can check this. Go here if you can read French.

We still need your help: We tried to determine the source-country of the diversion by cross-checking the serial numbers we had found with the Belgian arms export licenses we had access to. It appears we made a mistake somewhere: we assumed one particular rifle, documented in the Jebel az-Zawiyah last September, came from Qatar or Kuwait, but the Belgian Foreign Affairs revealed it came from the United Arab Emirates. Get in touch if you think you can help. IMPORTANT UPDATE, March 19, 2013: The mistake has been located. An updated demonstration is available here. 

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In the attempt to document as much as possible the current Syrian conflict, we are posting on this website pictures of arms and ordnance used by the Syrian army and/or the Syrian insurgents.

The latest trip inside was particularly rich. Some of the ordnance you will see have already been identified pretty accurately, using a process that can only gain by being known: collaboration (much in the fashion of C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times, here and here). Some are still incomplete puzzles, or total mysteries. If you think you can help, please get in touch.

We will come back to some of the weapons later, as they may be able to tell more than just their name.

You can navigate by using the arrows, left and right of the pictures. Thanks to those who helped (like Nic Jenzen-Jones) and those who will.

cjchivers:

A Weapon’s Journey.

The most likely arc? Made in Belgium for American-designed anti-tank weapons. Sold and shipped to Col. Muammar el-Qaddfi in Libya after he deposed King Idris, upended relations with the United States and sought fresh sources for arms. Seized decades later by looters who carted away the Brother-Leader’s arms stockpiles and turned part of his own arsenal against him, and cached or sold the rest. Smuggled to Mali for use by Islamists who overran the country’s north. Visible again now after the Islamists were smacked from the air in Konna during a French-led military attack, and lost custody of their weapons, too.

Arms and ordnance can sometimes point to history in remarkably rich ways. The NR-160 projectile seen in the top photograph, above, appears to be about as rich a case as they come. It’s a marker of the see-saw (and alternately naive and cynical) contests for primacy in North Africa, and just as much an artifact of its times as Patty Heart’s M-1 carbine. It also underlines the costly and lingering effects of the West’s military intervention in Libya, during and after which NATO and most of the allied nations showed little interest and took little action to stop the flow of weapons that the NATO air campaign helped accelerate.

A hat-tip or eleven: The photographs above were made by Rich Valdmanis, the deputy chief correspondent in West Africa for Reuters, who, with David Lewis and Eric Gaillard, was the first to take the trouble to document the presence of 106-millimeter projectiles in contested territory in Mali. Mr. Gaillard filed a photograph of one of the projectiles to the wire service, the use of which helped us to identify the weapon, check it against our registry of weapons and ordnance known to have been in Libya, and then, with a timely dash into the records by Damien Spleeters, an independent arms researcher, to work backward through export licenses in Belgium’s state archives and sketch more of the history. Mr. Valdmanis and Mr. Lewis also provided local tactical context, and Mr. Valdmanis shared the photographs above. Tyler Hicks meanwhile scoured Konna and found more samples of Belgian 106s in former Islamist positions. Neil Corney and James Bevan added regional insight, and John Ismay’s archival digging on America’s cold war military engagement with Libya, and how it failed, interlocked neatly with this fresh case. Three other friends from the ordnance field pitched in, but they prefer to keep their names out of it.

The result is here, on the NYT, with Tyler’s photographs.

We say it often: data-sharing and collaboration between field and archival researchers are often essential to illuminating the complexities and far-flung connections that show how arms actually move about the world. Look away from those annual reports that tell you, with assumed gravitas, which countries exported what dollar amounts of weapons. They tell you very little, and almost nothing about how weapons actually find their way to war. 

ABOUT THE PHOTOGRAPHS

A NR-160 projectile in Konna, damaged and separated from its cartridge case. The NR-160 is a high-explosive anti-tank round fired through the M40 series of recoilless rifles. Bottom, markings on the bottom of a companion 106-millimeter round from P.R.B., the same Belgian manufacturer. This is a HESH round. Both by Rich Valdmanis. More about 106s, HESH rounds and North Africa here, with sad and grisly video by Andre Liohn. There’s plenty more to say. But other leads are stacked up this morning. Best get to them.

More details on the Belgian side of the story as soon as I get some time to write it… stay tuned.

Belgian arms export licenses. Thousands of them. This sample you see right here is just for some countries, for a few years. Remember? In 1977, the Belgian Foreign Affairs are preparing a briefing for the Belgian ambassador to Libya. It this briefing note, one can read: “In the arms sector, Libya has become our first customer”. Just how many weapons, and of what types, were to be transfered to Gaddafi’s Libya? This will remain — probably forever — an question without answer. Through what appears to have been a remissness, the Belgian arms export licenses from 1975 to 1979 have been destroyed by the Belgian authorities. This, under Belgian law, is illegal. But this, under Belgian law, will stay unpunished, and will likely happen again. Some of the weapons transfered at that time to Libya were set loose by the 2011 conflict, and will eventually be found in other hands, in other countries, other conflicts. But not “in an other time”. There is no “other time”. There are no boundaries between past and present when it comes to the arms trade. The weapons a government sold yesterday cannot be suddenly forgotten, they last longer than our memories. One cannot sweep guns under a rug very long unnoticed. To read more about these archives, illegally destroyed, read Apache (in Dutch). A much shorter version, in French, appears in Le Vif on this week. My thanks go to the Fonds Pascal Decroos for Investigative Journalism, which funded this slow journalism piece. More to come, hopefully soon. — The picture was taken by the author, one of those digging days, in December 2012.
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Belgian arms export licenses. Thousands of them. This sample you see right here is just for some countries, for a few years. Remember?

In 1977, the Belgian Foreign Affairs are preparing a briefing for the Belgian ambassador to Libya. It this briefing note, one can read: “In the arms sector, Libya has become our first customer”. Just how many weapons, and of what types, were to be transfered to Gaddafi’s Libya? This will remain — probably forever — an question without answer. Through what appears to have been a remissness, the Belgian arms export licenses from 1975 to 1979 have been destroyed by the Belgian authorities. This, under Belgian law, is illegal. But this, under Belgian law, will stay unpunished, and will likely happen again.

Some of the weapons transfered at that time to Libya were set loose by the 2011 conflict, and will eventually be found in other hands, in other countries, other conflicts. But not “in an other time”.

There is no “other time”. There are no boundaries between past and present when it comes to the arms trade. The weapons a government sold yesterday cannot be suddenly forgotten, they last longer than our memories. One cannot sweep guns under a rug very long unnoticed.

To read more about these archives, illegally destroyed, read Apache (in Dutch). A much shorter version, in French, appears in Le Vif on this week.

My thanks go to the Fonds Pascal Decroos for Investigative Journalism, which funded this slow journalism piece. More to come, hopefully soon.

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The picture was taken by the author, one of those digging days, in December 2012.

November 2008, the Belgian arms producer FN Herstal, owned by the Walloon government, has already signed a contract in May with Gaddafi’s Libya and is waiting for the export licenses the government has to issue. 

In the meantime, representatives of the company are in Tripoli, on the occasion of the LibDex 2008, to present their products. Those products would, eventually, be found by a reported in the hands of the fighters who captured them from the soldiers of the 32nd “Khamis” Brigade during the 2011 conflict. For more information about this, click here.

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On this photo, the third man from the left (blue suit, not hat, white hair) is Abu-Bakr Yunis, who was the Libyan Minister of Defense under Gaddafi. He was reportedly killed during the battle of Sirte, in October 2011. The first man from the left is Reefi Shreef, head of the Gaddafi Air and Air Defense Forces, said a Libyan activist who added that the man in brown suit, with glasses, facing the camera is the general manager of Waha Expo, where the LixDex 2008 was organized.

Who are the Belgian representatives? One of them is probably this “Mr. Michel” quoted in 2008 by the Tripoli Post: 

We supply Pistols, over assault riffles, light and medium machine guns and several kinds of weapons for ant-rioting. We worked closely with Libyan defense force since seventies, let say after the attainment of Libya’s independence, we do appreciate our partnership.

To see the other pictures, scroll left and right, above. If you recognize any of the persons on these pictures, please contact me at @damspleet.

h/t Libyan Proud

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The pictures were all found on the website of the LibDex

Turkish shells in Russian shotgun to hunt the dogs of Jebel al-Zawiya. Last September, in Syria, we accompanied members of the al-Khalaf family into a dog-hunting trip. When the army of Bashar al-Assad was occupying the  Jebel al-Zawiya area, dogs proliferated by eating the corpses that were dumped in the fields. Today, they wander in flock near the villages, attacking the livings, and now they have to be hunted down. The box of shotgun shells you see above was bought by a member of the al-Khalaf family, from an arms dealer established in the Idlib province, for the equivalent of €15 per box. C.J. Chivers (@cjchivers), senior writer for The New York Times, has found a box of the same brand during his last trip in Aleppo. Thanks to Nic Marsh, of the Norwegian Institute on Small Arms Transfers (@NisatPrio), we’re now able to identify the manufacturer: the Turkish company Turaç. Why are we publishing this? In an effort, as C.J. Chivers puts it, to encourage journalists and researchers in conflict zones and post-conflict areas to document and share details on the tools of war, so that these tools may be better followed, and understood, as they move about our world. If governments and manufactures will not be transparent about weapons transfers, those out in the field where the weapons have their effects can be transparent about where they are found. We could not be more supportive of such an effort. More pictures now, of the weapon those Turkish shells were feeding: The two hunters we accompanied were using this Russian-made shotgun (we had to take several pictures, as the weapon was next to us in the car).   This firearm was also used to hunt the birds we ate. There is a lot to say about this hunting. We leave this for another post, later.
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Turkish shells in Russian shotgun to hunt the dogs of Jebel al-Zawiya.

Last September, in Syria, we accompanied members of the al-Khalaf family into a dog-hunting trip. When the army of Bashar al-Assad was occupying the  Jebel al-Zawiya area, dogs proliferated by eating the corpses that were dumped in the fields. Today, they wander in flock near the villages, attacking the livings, and now they have to be hunted down.

The box of shotgun shells you see above was bought by a member of the al-Khalaf family, from an arms dealer established in the Idlib province, for the equivalent of €15 per box. C.J. Chivers (@cjchivers), senior writer for The New York Times, has found a box of the same brand during his last trip in Aleppo.

Thanks to Nic Marsh, of the Norwegian Institute on Small Arms Transfers (@NisatPrio), we’re now able to identify the manufacturer: the Turkish company Turaç.

Why are we publishing this? In an effort, as C.J. Chivers puts it,

to encourage journalists and researchers in conflict zones and post-conflict areas to document and share details on the tools of war, so that these tools may be better followed, and understood, as they move about our world. If governments and manufactures will not be transparent about weapons transfers, those out in the field where the weapons have their effects can be transparent about where they are found.

We could not be more supportive of such an effort.

More pictures now, of the weapon those Turkish shells were feeding: The two hunters we accompanied were using this Russian-made shotgun (we had to take several pictures, as the weapon was next to us in the car).

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This firearm was also used to hunt the birds we ate. There is a lot to say about this hunting. We leave this for another post, later.

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Which Countries are Supplying Syrian Rebels with Belgian FAL Rifles? The Data Answer

IMPORTANT UPDATE, March 19, 2013: there was a mistake in this demonstration, it has been corrected. An updated demonstration is available here. Please consider the demonstration below has part of a trial and error learning process.

Some results out of a first digging into the Belgian arms export licenses archives.

Keep in mind that a license does not always equal an export. So far, we do not have the data for the arms exports themselves, but the licenses give quite a good idea of what was going on.

For now, we’ll focus on the licenses asked by the FN Herstal plant regarding only one type of equipment: an “automatic/semi-automatic rifle caliber 7.62”. As no other rifle of this caliber was produced by this plant in that period, we can assume that these licenses are for the FN FAL.

We did not have access to all the archives, for several reasons (we’ll talk about it later). Partly thanks to a FOIA procedure, we had access to the years: 

  • 1969-1974
  • 1980-1988

Total: 15 years

The FAL production, in Belgium, started in 1953 to end somewhere at the end of the 80s (the latest occurrence is 1988 for the moment). Years missing: 21.

These are the countries we studied:

  • Syria
  • Turkey
  • Iraq
  • Jordan
  • Qatar
  • Lebanon
  • Libya
  • Saudi Arabia
  • Kuwait
  • United Arab Emirats
  • Oman

Please note that we are still studying the data: those results might still change - slightly.


Afficher The FAL presence around Syria sur une carte plus grande

DATA

SYRIA

  • 1969-1974: 0*
  • 1980-1988: 0
  • TOTAL: 0

*There is a mention of a 100 FAL rifles license for Syria in 1969. This license was not asked by the FN Herstal plant, but by another company. It is thus difficult to assess if those FAL rifles were made in Belgium, and we preferred to leave them out for now. We will write soon about the Belgian FAL rifles sold to Syria before 1969, thanks to someone who approached us on Twitter.

TURKEY

  • 1969-1974: 0
  • 1980-1988: 0
  • TOTAL: 0

IRAQ

  • 1969-1974: 0
  • 1980-1988: 0
  • TOTAL: 0

JORDAN

  • 1969-1974: 0
  • 1980-1988:  max. 9
  • TOTAL: max. 9

QATAR

  • 1969-1974: 2,000
  • 1980-1988: 12,400
  • TOTAL: 14,400

LEBANON

  • 1969-1974: 10,715
  • 1980-1988: 0
  • TOTAL: 10,715

LIBYA

  • 1969-1974: 44,260
  • 1980-1988: 2,000
  • TOTAL: 46,260

SAUDI ARABIA

  • 1969-1974: 19,982
  • 1980-1988: 4,501
  • TOTAL: 24,483

KUWAIT

  • 1969-1974: 2,310
  • 1980-1988: 26,206
  • TOTAL: 28,516

UNITED ARAB EMIRATS

  • 1969-1974: 7,069
  • 1980-1988: 6,708
  • TOTAL: 13,777

OMAN

  • 1969-1974: 17,861
  • 1980-1988: 6,201
  • TOTAL: 24,062

OBSERVATIONS

Although the data is very limited (limited number of years + license is not export), some observations can be made. These observations are based on the temporary results and are, thus, not definitive.

With the exception of some Israeli-made rifles, the FALs observed in Syria do not bear any factory markings other than the typical Belgian production marks. Other marking could have indicated rifles were produced or assembled outside of Belgium; as it stands, the rifles observe appear to have originated from FN Herstal.

According to the features and to the serial numbers observed on the FAL rifles we have found in Syria, we estimate their production time to be post-78, and probably somewhere in the years 1980.

Syria did not order any FAL rifles between 1980 and 1988. Therefore, the FAL rifles observed on the ground come from outside.

The countries we chose to study are the one regularly appearing in the news as sending Syrian insurgents weapons or as being a territory from which weapons are supplied to them.

Rebel fighters have said that some of their FAL rifles were supplied by Libya. But most of the Libyan FAL rifles were ordered before 1980. Therefore, most of the FAL rifles supplied by Libya do not originate from Libya itself.

A CONCRETE EXAMPLE

Have a look at those pictures, below, part of a batch from Syria we published earlier. Let’s narrow down the production time and possible countries of diversion.

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PICTURE 1: This is a FAL rifle found in the Jebel al-Zawiya region in September 2012 in the hands of the insurgents fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad. No licensed production marks were found on this rifle, which indicates that this weapons has been produced in Belgium, at the FN Herstal plant.

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PICTURE 2: The upper receiver is a Type III receiver, which was made as from 1973. This rifle was, thus, made after 1973.

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PICTURE 3: The bipods grooves, under the hand guard, is an option introduced as standard as from 1978. This rifle was thus made after 1978.

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PICTURE 4: There are two serial numbers on this rifle. This feature was introduced in 1972, which confirms the fact that this rifle is a post 1972 rifle. Moreover, after 1972, the serial number found on the right of the FN FAL rifle indicates the total number of FAL rifles made by FN Herstal in Belgium. The million was reached in or after 1978. This confirms what we said about the bipod grooves feature. According to the right side serial number, we can assess that this rifle was produced in or around 1980.

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PICTURE 5: As from 1972, the left side serial number indicates the number of FN FAL rifles in a country’s stock. This FN FAL rifle, being the 1.117.071st of its kind produced in Belgium, is only the 4536th to have been sold to a particular country, in or around 1980. What is this country?

Well, it’s not Syria, which means that the country that bought this FN FAL rifle in or around 1980 diverted this weapon to a 3rd party at one point.

Looking at the data above, we can say that this rifle was not sold to Turkey, nor to Iraq, and probably not to Jordania. It was not sold to Libya, nor Saudi Arabia, nor Lebanon, nor the UAE, nor Oman. All those countries already had a stock of FN FAL counting more than 4536 rifles in 1980. On the other hand, this rifle could well come from Qatar or Kuwait.

Only one of the FAL rifles we observed in Syria was bearing two serial numbers, which allowed us to narrow down the possibilities. With the other rifles, only the ‘general’ right side serial number was there. So we can only talk about the possible production time, and not about the possible diverting country. This could also mean that more than one country is supplying Belgian FAL rifles to the rebels. The other rifles observed bear de serial numbers: 1,730,043 ; 1,732,382 ; 1,462,215 ; 1,473,224 ; 1,474,077. This indicates that they have been produced after 1980, and can not, therefore, have been purchased by Syria, according to the Belgian arms export licenses we had access to.

There is a way to know where those FAL rifles were sold to, and which country diverted them. The only way to know which countries are supplying the Syrian insurgents in FAL rifles would be to trace the serial numbers collected on the ground. In the Walloon Parliament, some have asked for the release of all FAL serial numbers in order to map the proliferation. The Belgian Walloon authorities, if they want to respect the legislation they are promoting, have to launch such a tracing procedure and have to make the result public. Will they do it?

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Any comment, observation, reaction: damien.spleeters@gmail.com or @damspleet on Twitter.

All the pictures are from the author.

Thanks to those who contributed to this article.

Thanks to N.R. Jenzen-Jones (@RogueAdventurer) for the editing.

In this video, uploaded on November 8, 2012, the Shuhada Suriya Brigade, in the Jebel al-Zawiya, Syria, gives a good view of its small arms arsenal. I count 11 FAL rifles in this video (see screenshots below). But there is probably more of them.

Thanks to @Bjoernen_dk for pointing this video out to me.

Two new videos from Syria in which FAL rifles appear.

Three in the first one, above (uploaded on November 2, 2012).

At least one, on the far right, in a second video (uploaded on November 7, 2012).

Thanks to @Brown_Moses and @bjoernen_dk for pointing them out to me.

A FAL rifle equipped with optic scope and used to snipe in Blleramoon district, Aleppo, Syria. Video uploaded on November 2, 2012. Once again, it looks like this fighter might be experiencing some trouble with his FAL rifle. He fires once, then has to manually action the bolt to feed the next cartridge and eject the spent one.

Two other examples of this problem were observed here and here.

(h/t @Bjoernen_dk)

A FAL rifle in the hands of a Syrian rebel fighter in Deir Ez Zor. Uploaded on November 2, 2012.

(h/t @Brown_Moses)

Two FAL rifles equipped with optic scopes, used by the Islam Brigade, which usually operates around Damascus, Syria. Video uploaded on November 2, 2012.

(h/t @Brown_Moses)

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